What the Rodriguez Decision Means for Massachusetts Gun Charges

On September 30, 2025, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627 (2025). The case did two things at once. First, it extended the equal-protection framework of Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711 (2020), backward into the earliest stages of police investigation, opening up a new suppression argument for defendants in gun cases that began on social media. Second, in a footnote, it abrogated part of Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471 (2025), the case I wrote about earlier this year.

Both pieces matter. Here's what the Court actually held, and what it means if you're facing a firearm charge in Massachusetts.

What Happened

Detective Matthew Krug of the Lowell police department's gang unit created an undercover Snapchat account in 2019. He chose a username and a bitmoji avatar that the prosecutor later acknowledged were both "nonwhite." His goal, by his own description, was to build as large a pool of Snapchat "friends" as possible so the account would look like a real user rather than a spam account.

Through that account, Krug eventually became Snapchat friends with a user named "boss man Nate." He did not know the user's identity or race at the time. On March 7, 2020, that account posted a video showing someone firing a turquoise-framed handgun out of a moving car window in Lowell. Police traced the location through Snapchat data, identified the suspect vehicle, obtained a search warrant, and recovered a matching firearm and shell casings. The defendant, Nathaniel Rodriguez, was charged with carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), and several related offenses.

Rodriguez moved to suppress on equal-protection grounds, arguing Krug's investigation was racially motivated. He also moved to dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth's resident firearm licensing scheme, § 131(d) read together with § 10(a)(2), was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Both motions were denied. Rodriguez entered a conditional plea, preserved the issues, and appealed. The SJC took the case on its own motion.

The Headline Holding: Long Now Reaches Pretrial Investigation

The big news is on the equal-protection side. Under Long, a defendant who can produce evidence supporting a reasonable inference that a police action was motivated, at least in part, by race shifts the burden to the Commonwealth to provide a race-neutral justification. Until Rodriguez, that framework was used mostly in the context of traffic stops and other face-to-face encounters. The SJC has now applied it to the earliest investigative stage: to choices about whom to surveil, whose accounts to friend, and whose neighborhoods to monitor, before any stop has occurred.

The Court found Rodriguez had met his initial Long burden based on a combination of facts: the deliberate choice of a nonwhite undercover persona; the fact that all seven Snapchat-based investigation defendants disclosed in discovery were nonwhite (Asian, Black, or Hispanic), in a city whose population was roughly 50% nonwhite; and the fact that the Lowell police department had no written policies, procedures, or training governing social media monitoring. Discretion in a vacuum, combined with a pattern of nonwhite targets, was enough.

The Commonwealth's main argument was that Krug couldn't have been racially motivated because he didn't know "boss man Nate's" race when they became Snapchat friends. The SJC rejected that, both on the facts and as a legal proposition: no single fact controls under the totality test, and even an officer's later monitoring choices, what to record, what to act on, happen after race becomes apparent.

The remedy: the denial of the motion to suppress was vacated, and the case was remanded for a further evidentiary hearing under Long step two, where the Commonwealth will have the burden of rebutting the inference of selective enforcement with a credible, race-neutral justification.

The Second Amendment Challenge and Why It Failed

On the firearms side, Rodriguez argued that the resident licensing scheme in effect at the time of his arrest was facially unconstitutional under Bruen. The SJC disagreed.

Applying the facial-challenge standard from United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court held that Rodriguez had to show that no set of circumstances exists under which the scheme would be valid. He couldn't meet that bar. The licensing scheme had at least some valid applications, most obviously, to felons and persons convicted of violent crimes, who fall outside the Second Amendment's protection of "law-abiding, responsible citizens" under Bruen and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Because the scheme was constitutional in at least some of its applications, the facial challenge failed, and the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed.

The Footnote That Limits Donnell

The same reasoning carries a sting for Donnell. Earlier this year, in Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471 (2025), the SJC held that the prior version of the nonresident firearm licensing scheme (§ 131F) was facially unconstitutional under Bruen. That holding rested on the conclusion that the constitutionally infirm parts of the nonresident scheme were not severable. In Rodriguez, the Court acknowledged that Donnell did not consider another part of the statute: the proviso that no license shall issue to anyone convicted of a felony or a violent crime. That proviso, like its counterpart on the resident side, gives the nonresident scheme at least some valid applications under Rahimi, which is fatal to a facial challenge.

The Court put it in Footnote 8:

In an earlier decision, we held that a former version of the Commonwealth's firearm licensing scheme for nonresidents was facially violative of the Second Amendment in light of Bruen. See Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471, 479-483 (2025). That decision was premised on the conclusion that the constitutionally infirm portions of the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme were not capable of severance. . . . However, our threshold conclusion that the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme was facially unconstitutional did not take into account the proviso that "no license shall be issued to a person who" has been convicted of a "felony" or a "violent crime." G. L. c. 140, § 131F (i) . . . . To the extent that this omission is called into question by today's opinion, Donnell is hereby abrogated.

The practical takeaway is narrower than it might sound. Rodriguez does not say that defendants who were charged or convicted under the old nonresident scheme are no longer entitled to relief in their own cases. It does, however, undercut the doctrinal foundation on which Donnell's facial-unconstitutionality holding rested. Anyone with a pending or contemplated Donnell-based motion needs to read Footnote 8 carefully and consider whether the underlying argument still holds after Rodriguez.

What This Means for Defendants

For anyone with a pending or recent Massachusetts firearm case, Rodriguez opens new defensive ground and narrows some older ground.

Suppression motions just got broader. A motion to suppress can now reach investigative decisions made long before any stop, arrest, or warrant — including social-media surveillance, undercover personas, and target selection. If your case began with a police officer monitoring social media accounts, that investigation is now in play under Long.

Discovery needs to be aggressive. To make a Long/Rodriguez showing, the defense needs the department's policies (or lack of policies) on social media monitoring, internal communications about undercover accounts, and data on who was investigated. Rodriguez prevailed in part because Lowell PD had no written guidance at all. Defendants in other jurisdictions will need to push for similar discovery.

Donnell-based motions need a fresh look. If you or prior counsel filed (or planned to file) a motion to vacate or dismiss based on Donnell, the Rodriguez footnote may change the analysis. The argument is not dead, but the doctrinal ground is shakier.

The Long framework now applies to a much wider universe of cases. Any prosecution that began with online surveillance, an undercover account, or a discretionary investigative choice is potentially subject to selective-enforcement analysis.

Bottom Line

Rodriguez is the kind of decision that quietly reshapes how a lot of cases get litigated. It strengthens equal-protection challenges at the earliest stage of an investigation, and it narrows the reach of Donnell-based Second Amendment relief.

If you are facing a firearm charge in Massachusetts, or you have a conviction that may be affected by Donnell, Rodriguez, or both, I'm happy to review the record and discuss what relief, if any, is available.

What Is Drug Possession in Massachusetts?

Drug possession charges in Massachusetts involve knowingly having a controlled substance without a valid prescription. The severity of the charge depends on the type of drug and the amount involved.

Simple possession is often charged as a misdemeanor, particularly for smaller amounts. However, certain drugs or repeat offenses can lead to more serious consequences. In some cases, possession may be treated as evidence of intent to distribute.

A key issue in many cases is whether the defendant actually possessed the drugs. Massachusetts law recognizes both actual and constructive possession, meaning knowledge of and control over the substance.

Defenses often focus on lack of knowledge, unlawful searches, or insufficient evidence. Drug cases frequently involve search and seizure issues, making suppression motions critical. Contact me today to discuss possible defenses to your case.

What Is the Difference Between the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 in Massachusetts?

Both the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights protect people from unreasonable searches and seizures. They share the same basic goal, to prevent police from overstepping their authority, but Massachusetts courts interpret Article 14 more broadly, giving residents stronger protections than the federal standard.

Under the Fourth Amendment, police actions are judged by what is reasonable under federal case law. The U.S. Supreme Court often uses balancing tests that weigh privacy rights against law enforcement interests. Massachusetts courts, however, have consistently held that Article 14 can go further. For example, the Supreme Judicial Court has required warrants or probable cause in situations where federal law would allow a search based only on reasonable suspicion.

This difference shows up often in suppression hearings. Evidence that might be admissible under federal law can still be thrown out under Article 14 if the state’s higher standard was not met. That includes vehicle searches, warrantless entries, and the use of cell phone data. When filing a motion to suppress, defense attorneys typically rely on both the Fourth Amendment and Article 14 to ensure full protection under both constitutions.

Understanding how Article 14 works gives defendants a stronger footing in challenging unlawful searches. A skilled attorney can help you if there has been an unlawful search. Massachusetts law does not just follow federal precedent, it often improves on it, making the state’s constitutional protections some of the strongest in the country.

Can the Police Search Your Car Without a Warrant in Massachusetts?

In Massachusetts, police don’t always need a warrant to search your car. But that doesn’t mean they can search it for no reason.

Warrantless car searches are allowed under several exceptions:
- If the officer has probable cause to believe there’s evidence of a crime
- If you give consent
- If the item is in plain view
- If the car is being towed or impounded

The most common justification is probable cause—like if the officer smells marijuana, sees a weapon, or gets conflicting statements. But officers sometimes stretch the truth or claim consent when none was given.

If your rights were violated during a search, I can file a motion to suppress the evidence. I’ve won cases where drugs, weapons, or other items were thrown out because the search was illegal.

You don’t have to let police search your car—and saying “no” doesn’t mean you’re guilty. If your car was searched and charges followed, let’s talk.

What Counts as an Illegal Search in Massachusetts?

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. But what does that mean in real life?

In Massachusetts, a search is illegal if:
- It’s done without a warrant or valid exception.
- It exceeds the scope of what the warrant allows.
- It’s based on evidence obtained illegally (a “fruit of the poisonous tree”).

Common exceptions to the warrant requirement include consent, plain view, search incident to arrest, and exigent circumstances. But even those are limited. Police often overstep, and courts frequently suppress evidence when they do.

If you believe you were searched illegally, the evidence found might not be admissible in court. That can change the outcome of your entire case. I regularly file motions to suppress and challenge the legality of police searches.