What the Rodriguez Decision Means for Massachusetts Gun Charges

On September 30, 2025, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627 (2025). The case did two things at once. First, it extended the equal-protection framework of Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711 (2020), backward into the earliest stages of police investigation, opening up a new suppression argument for defendants in gun cases that began on social media. Second, in a footnote, it abrogated part of Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471 (2025), the case I wrote about earlier this year.

Both pieces matter. Here's what the Court actually held, and what it means if you're facing a firearm charge in Massachusetts.

What Happened

Detective Matthew Krug of the Lowell police department's gang unit created an undercover Snapchat account in 2019. He chose a username and a bitmoji avatar that the prosecutor later acknowledged were both "nonwhite." His goal, by his own description, was to build as large a pool of Snapchat "friends" as possible so the account would look like a real user rather than a spam account.

Through that account, Krug eventually became Snapchat friends with a user named "boss man Nate." He did not know the user's identity or race at the time. On March 7, 2020, that account posted a video showing someone firing a turquoise-framed handgun out of a moving car window in Lowell. Police traced the location through Snapchat data, identified the suspect vehicle, obtained a search warrant, and recovered a matching firearm and shell casings. The defendant, Nathaniel Rodriguez, was charged with carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), and several related offenses.

Rodriguez moved to suppress on equal-protection grounds, arguing Krug's investigation was racially motivated. He also moved to dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth's resident firearm licensing scheme, § 131(d) read together with § 10(a)(2), was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Both motions were denied. Rodriguez entered a conditional plea, preserved the issues, and appealed. The SJC took the case on its own motion.

The Headline Holding: Long Now Reaches Pretrial Investigation

The big news is on the equal-protection side. Under Long, a defendant who can produce evidence supporting a reasonable inference that a police action was motivated, at least in part, by race shifts the burden to the Commonwealth to provide a race-neutral justification. Until Rodriguez, that framework was used mostly in the context of traffic stops and other face-to-face encounters. The SJC has now applied it to the earliest investigative stage: to choices about whom to surveil, whose accounts to friend, and whose neighborhoods to monitor, before any stop has occurred.

The Court found Rodriguez had met his initial Long burden based on a combination of facts: the deliberate choice of a nonwhite undercover persona; the fact that all seven Snapchat-based investigation defendants disclosed in discovery were nonwhite (Asian, Black, or Hispanic), in a city whose population was roughly 50% nonwhite; and the fact that the Lowell police department had no written policies, procedures, or training governing social media monitoring. Discretion in a vacuum, combined with a pattern of nonwhite targets, was enough.

The Commonwealth's main argument was that Krug couldn't have been racially motivated because he didn't know "boss man Nate's" race when they became Snapchat friends. The SJC rejected that, both on the facts and as a legal proposition: no single fact controls under the totality test, and even an officer's later monitoring choices, what to record, what to act on, happen after race becomes apparent.

The remedy: the denial of the motion to suppress was vacated, and the case was remanded for a further evidentiary hearing under Long step two, where the Commonwealth will have the burden of rebutting the inference of selective enforcement with a credible, race-neutral justification.

The Second Amendment Challenge and Why It Failed

On the firearms side, Rodriguez argued that the resident licensing scheme in effect at the time of his arrest was facially unconstitutional under Bruen. The SJC disagreed.

Applying the facial-challenge standard from United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court held that Rodriguez had to show that no set of circumstances exists under which the scheme would be valid. He couldn't meet that bar. The licensing scheme had at least some valid applications, most obviously, to felons and persons convicted of violent crimes, who fall outside the Second Amendment's protection of "law-abiding, responsible citizens" under Bruen and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Because the scheme was constitutional in at least some of its applications, the facial challenge failed, and the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed.

The Footnote That Limits Donnell

The same reasoning carries a sting for Donnell. Earlier this year, in Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471 (2025), the SJC held that the prior version of the nonresident firearm licensing scheme (§ 131F) was facially unconstitutional under Bruen. That holding rested on the conclusion that the constitutionally infirm parts of the nonresident scheme were not severable. In Rodriguez, the Court acknowledged that Donnell did not consider another part of the statute: the proviso that no license shall issue to anyone convicted of a felony or a violent crime. That proviso, like its counterpart on the resident side, gives the nonresident scheme at least some valid applications under Rahimi, which is fatal to a facial challenge.

The Court put it in Footnote 8:

In an earlier decision, we held that a former version of the Commonwealth's firearm licensing scheme for nonresidents was facially violative of the Second Amendment in light of Bruen. See Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471, 479-483 (2025). That decision was premised on the conclusion that the constitutionally infirm portions of the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme were not capable of severance. . . . However, our threshold conclusion that the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme was facially unconstitutional did not take into account the proviso that "no license shall be issued to a person who" has been convicted of a "felony" or a "violent crime." G. L. c. 140, § 131F (i) . . . . To the extent that this omission is called into question by today's opinion, Donnell is hereby abrogated.

The practical takeaway is narrower than it might sound. Rodriguez does not say that defendants who were charged or convicted under the old nonresident scheme are no longer entitled to relief in their own cases. It does, however, undercut the doctrinal foundation on which Donnell's facial-unconstitutionality holding rested. Anyone with a pending or contemplated Donnell-based motion needs to read Footnote 8 carefully and consider whether the underlying argument still holds after Rodriguez.

What This Means for Defendants

For anyone with a pending or recent Massachusetts firearm case, Rodriguez opens new defensive ground and narrows some older ground.

Suppression motions just got broader. A motion to suppress can now reach investigative decisions made long before any stop, arrest, or warrant — including social-media surveillance, undercover personas, and target selection. If your case began with a police officer monitoring social media accounts, that investigation is now in play under Long.

Discovery needs to be aggressive. To make a Long/Rodriguez showing, the defense needs the department's policies (or lack of policies) on social media monitoring, internal communications about undercover accounts, and data on who was investigated. Rodriguez prevailed in part because Lowell PD had no written guidance at all. Defendants in other jurisdictions will need to push for similar discovery.

Donnell-based motions need a fresh look. If you or prior counsel filed (or planned to file) a motion to vacate or dismiss based on Donnell, the Rodriguez footnote may change the analysis. The argument is not dead, but the doctrinal ground is shakier.

The Long framework now applies to a much wider universe of cases. Any prosecution that began with online surveillance, an undercover account, or a discretionary investigative choice is potentially subject to selective-enforcement analysis.

Bottom Line

Rodriguez is the kind of decision that quietly reshapes how a lot of cases get litigated. It strengthens equal-protection challenges at the earliest stage of an investigation, and it narrows the reach of Donnell-based Second Amendment relief.

If you are facing a firearm charge in Massachusetts, or you have a conviction that may be affected by Donnell, Rodriguez, or both, I'm happy to review the record and discuss what relief, if any, is available.

The Karen Read Case Heads to the Jury: What It Reveals About Massachusetts Criminal Trials

On June 13, 2025, the second-degree murder trial of Karen Read entered its most critical phase: jury deliberations. The Norfolk Superior Court case, now in its second trial after a mistrial in 2024, has gripped Massachusetts and raised deep questions about how we investigate, charge, and try serious crimes when law enforcement itself becomes part of the story.

The Charges and the Allegations

Karen Read stands accused of killing her boyfriend, Boston police officer John O’Keefe, by backing into him with her SUV and leaving him to die in the snow outside a fellow officer’s home in January 2022. Prosecutors allege she was intoxicated, reckless, and later admitted guilt to emergency responders, quoting her as saying, “I hit him. I hit him.”

The defense tells a different story: that O’Keefe was attacked inside the house and that Read has been framed in a cover-up involving local police officers who mishandled the investigation, overlooked exculpatory evidence, and allowed forensic contamination to go unchecked.

Key Evidence Under Scrutiny

This case is a study in contested forensic interpretation:

• Vehicle damage and taillight fragments: Prosecutors say they prove a hit; defense experts suggest they were staged or planted.

• Injury patterns on O’Keefe’s body: Medical experts disagree on whether they’re consistent with a vehicle strike or an assault.

• Cell phone and text message data: Heavily analyzed by both sides to establish timeline, intent, and intoxication levels.

For lawyers and observers alike, the trial highlights just how fragile physical evidence can become when filtered through competing expert witnesses, inconsistent police reports, and intense media attention.

Why This Case Matters

This isn’t just about Karen Read. It’s about:

• Transparency and trust in police-led investigations when officers are connected to the alleged crime.

• The role of public pressure, media narratives, and social media activism in shaping trial dynamics.

• The importance of jury instructions and burden of proof in a high-emotion, circumstantial case.

Whether the jury convicts, acquits, or deadlocks again, the Read case is now a touchstone in Massachusetts criminal law, a reminder that trials aren’t just about facts; they’re about how those facts are framed, who the public trusts to present them, and what jurors believe beyond a reasonable doubt.

Massachusetts Criminal Defense Attorneys Walk Off the Job—Here’s Why It Matters to You

On May 28, 2025, hundreds of criminal defense attorneys across Massachusetts staged a work stoppage. This wasn’t a publicity stunt or a political protest, it was a necessary stand for the integrity of our legal system. We did it because the Commonwealth has failed to pay public defenders a livable wage, and justice is already starting to suffer.

If you've ever faced a criminal charge in Massachusetts and couldn’t afford a private lawyer, you were probably represented by a bar advocate. These are private attorneys, like me, who contract with the state to defend indigent clients in district and superior court. The work is demanding, often urgent, and absolutely essential to make the Sixth Amendment a reality.

But here’s the problem: the rates haven't kept up with inflation, with rising overhead, or with the complexity of modern criminal practice. Right now, the base hourly rate for bar advocates in district court is just $65 per hour. For that, attorneys are expected to respond to emergencies, juggle crowded dockets, and provide the same level of care we would offer to any private client. By contrast, Maine currently receives $150 per hour, New Hampshire $125 per hour and Rhode Island $112 per hour.

It’s not sustainable. And more importantly, it’s not fair to the people caught in the system. Chronic underfunding means fewer attorneys are taking bar advocate cases, and the ones who remain are overworked. That leads to delays, overloaded dockets, and worse outcomes for the accused. Justice delayed is justice denied.

If the state wants to keep promising the right to counsel, it needs to actually fund it. Until then, we’ll keep raising our voices.

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I was proud to stand with my fellow attorneys in this effort. If you have questions about your rights or need help navigating the criminal legal system in Massachusetts, I’m here to help.

Source: Massachusetts private attorneys, seeking pay raise, refuse criminal defense work

A Troubling Case Against a Wisconsin Judge

On May 15, 2025, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Hannah Dugan pleaded not guilty to federal charges of obstructing immigration enforcement. Prosecutors allege that she helped Eduardo Flores-Ruiz, a man reportedly in the country without legal status, leave the courthouse through a nonpublic exit to avoid arrest by ICE agents. The battery case against Flores-Ruiz had just been dismissed. Now, based on minimal evidence, including vague security footage and a court deputy’s account, Judge Dugan faces a criminal trial.

Her legal team has moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that she acted within her lawful discretion as a judge and is immune from prosecution. The case raises significant concerns about federal overreach and the politicization of immigration enforcement. It is virtually unprecedented to prosecute a sitting judge for a split-second decision made within the courthouse, and many see this as an attempt to intimidate the judiciary.

Beyond the courtroom, this indictment sends a chilling message: that federal prosecutors may criminally charge state judges whose actions, however legal, conflict with ICE’s objectives. Whether or not one agrees with Judge Dugan’s conduct, the prosecution threatens to erode judicial independence and weaponize immigration enforcement in ways that undermine basic principles of due process and state sovereignty.

Source: AP News – Wisconsin Judge Pleads Not Guilty to Helping Man Evade ICE

SCOTUS Block Trump’s Attempt to Deport Venezuelans Under Wartime Law

In a major ruling this week, the U.S. Supreme Court blocked the Trump administration from using a centuries-old wartime law to deport Venezuelan migrants without proper legal procedures. The administration claimed national security concerns, but many targeted individuals had no criminal records and at least one man was deported despite a court order protecting him.

As a criminal defense attorney, I see this decision as a powerful reminder: due process isn’t optional. Whether you’re facing criminal charges or immigration proceedings, the government must follow the law. No one should be detained or deported without a fair opportunity to respond.

This case underscores why legal representation matters and why courts still serve as an essential check when the government overreaches.

Source: Reuters - U.S. Supreme Court maintains block on Trump deportations under wartime law