What the Rodriguez Decision Means for Massachusetts Gun Charges

On September 30, 2025, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decided Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627 (2025). The case did two things at once. First, it extended the equal-protection framework of Commonwealth v. Long, 485 Mass. 711 (2020), backward into the earliest stages of police investigation, opening up a new suppression argument for defendants in gun cases that began on social media. Second, in a footnote, it abrogated part of Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471 (2025), the case I wrote about earlier this year.

Both pieces matter. Here's what the Court actually held, and what it means if you're facing a firearm charge in Massachusetts.

What Happened

Detective Matthew Krug of the Lowell police department's gang unit created an undercover Snapchat account in 2019. He chose a username and a bitmoji avatar that the prosecutor later acknowledged were both "nonwhite." His goal, by his own description, was to build as large a pool of Snapchat "friends" as possible so the account would look like a real user rather than a spam account.

Through that account, Krug eventually became Snapchat friends with a user named "boss man Nate." He did not know the user's identity or race at the time. On March 7, 2020, that account posted a video showing someone firing a turquoise-framed handgun out of a moving car window in Lowell. Police traced the location through Snapchat data, identified the suspect vehicle, obtained a search warrant, and recovered a matching firearm and shell casings. The defendant, Nathaniel Rodriguez, was charged with carrying a firearm without a license under G. L. c. 269, § 10(a), and several related offenses.

Rodriguez moved to suppress on equal-protection grounds, arguing Krug's investigation was racially motivated. He also moved to dismiss, arguing that the Commonwealth's resident firearm licensing scheme, § 131(d) read together with § 10(a)(2), was facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022). Both motions were denied. Rodriguez entered a conditional plea, preserved the issues, and appealed. The SJC took the case on its own motion.

The Headline Holding: Long Now Reaches Pretrial Investigation

The big news is on the equal-protection side. Under Long, a defendant who can produce evidence supporting a reasonable inference that a police action was motivated, at least in part, by race shifts the burden to the Commonwealth to provide a race-neutral justification. Until Rodriguez, that framework was used mostly in the context of traffic stops and other face-to-face encounters. The SJC has now applied it to the earliest investigative stage: to choices about whom to surveil, whose accounts to friend, and whose neighborhoods to monitor, before any stop has occurred.

The Court found Rodriguez had met his initial Long burden based on a combination of facts: the deliberate choice of a nonwhite undercover persona; the fact that all seven Snapchat-based investigation defendants disclosed in discovery were nonwhite (Asian, Black, or Hispanic), in a city whose population was roughly 50% nonwhite; and the fact that the Lowell police department had no written policies, procedures, or training governing social media monitoring. Discretion in a vacuum, combined with a pattern of nonwhite targets, was enough.

The Commonwealth's main argument was that Krug couldn't have been racially motivated because he didn't know "boss man Nate's" race when they became Snapchat friends. The SJC rejected that, both on the facts and as a legal proposition: no single fact controls under the totality test, and even an officer's later monitoring choices, what to record, what to act on, happen after race becomes apparent.

The remedy: the denial of the motion to suppress was vacated, and the case was remanded for a further evidentiary hearing under Long step two, where the Commonwealth will have the burden of rebutting the inference of selective enforcement with a credible, race-neutral justification.

The Second Amendment Challenge and Why It Failed

On the firearms side, Rodriguez argued that the resident licensing scheme in effect at the time of his arrest was facially unconstitutional under Bruen. The SJC disagreed.

Applying the facial-challenge standard from United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024), the Court held that Rodriguez had to show that no set of circumstances exists under which the scheme would be valid. He couldn't meet that bar. The licensing scheme had at least some valid applications, most obviously, to felons and persons convicted of violent crimes, who fall outside the Second Amendment's protection of "law-abiding, responsible citizens" under Bruen and District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). Because the scheme was constitutional in at least some of its applications, the facial challenge failed, and the denial of the motion to dismiss was affirmed.

The Footnote That Limits Donnell

The same reasoning carries a sting for Donnell. Earlier this year, in Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471 (2025), the SJC held that the prior version of the nonresident firearm licensing scheme (§ 131F) was facially unconstitutional under Bruen. That holding rested on the conclusion that the constitutionally infirm parts of the nonresident scheme were not severable. In Rodriguez, the Court acknowledged that Donnell did not consider another part of the statute: the proviso that no license shall issue to anyone convicted of a felony or a violent crime. That proviso, like its counterpart on the resident side, gives the nonresident scheme at least some valid applications under Rahimi, which is fatal to a facial challenge.

The Court put it in Footnote 8:

In an earlier decision, we held that a former version of the Commonwealth's firearm licensing scheme for nonresidents was facially violative of the Second Amendment in light of Bruen. See Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471, 479-483 (2025). That decision was premised on the conclusion that the constitutionally infirm portions of the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme were not capable of severance. . . . However, our threshold conclusion that the Commonwealth's nonresident firearm licensing scheme was facially unconstitutional did not take into account the proviso that "no license shall be issued to a person who" has been convicted of a "felony" or a "violent crime." G. L. c. 140, § 131F (i) . . . . To the extent that this omission is called into question by today's opinion, Donnell is hereby abrogated.

The practical takeaway is narrower than it might sound. Rodriguez does not say that defendants who were charged or convicted under the old nonresident scheme are no longer entitled to relief in their own cases. It does, however, undercut the doctrinal foundation on which Donnell's facial-unconstitutionality holding rested. Anyone with a pending or contemplated Donnell-based motion needs to read Footnote 8 carefully and consider whether the underlying argument still holds after Rodriguez.

What This Means for Defendants

For anyone with a pending or recent Massachusetts firearm case, Rodriguez opens new defensive ground and narrows some older ground.

Suppression motions just got broader. A motion to suppress can now reach investigative decisions made long before any stop, arrest, or warrant — including social-media surveillance, undercover personas, and target selection. If your case began with a police officer monitoring social media accounts, that investigation is now in play under Long.

Discovery needs to be aggressive. To make a Long/Rodriguez showing, the defense needs the department's policies (or lack of policies) on social media monitoring, internal communications about undercover accounts, and data on who was investigated. Rodriguez prevailed in part because Lowell PD had no written guidance at all. Defendants in other jurisdictions will need to push for similar discovery.

Donnell-based motions need a fresh look. If you or prior counsel filed (or planned to file) a motion to vacate or dismiss based on Donnell, the Rodriguez footnote may change the analysis. The argument is not dead, but the doctrinal ground is shakier.

The Long framework now applies to a much wider universe of cases. Any prosecution that began with online surveillance, an undercover account, or a discretionary investigative choice is potentially subject to selective-enforcement analysis.

Bottom Line

Rodriguez is the kind of decision that quietly reshapes how a lot of cases get litigated. It strengthens equal-protection challenges at the earliest stage of an investigation, and it narrows the reach of Donnell-based Second Amendment relief.

If you are facing a firearm charge in Massachusetts, or you have a conviction that may be affected by Donnell, Rodriguez, or both, I'm happy to review the record and discuss what relief, if any, is available.

How the Donnell Decision Could Overturn Gun Possession Convictions in Massachusetts

UPDATE: Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 496 Mass. 627 (2025), significantly changes the analysis of this post. You can read how here.

Massachusetts SJC Strikes Down “May Issue” Firearms Law for Out-of-State Residents: What It Means for Defendants

In the wake of a major decision issued this month, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has struck down the Commonwealth’s former “may issue” gun licensing scheme for out-of-state residents. In Commonwealth v. Donnell, 495 Mass. 471 (2025), the Court ruled that the discretionary license process violated the Second Amendment. For anyone charged under M.G.L. c. 269 §§ 10(a) or 10(h), this ruling may open the door to significant relief, even vacating a conviction entirely.

What Was the Issue?

Massachusetts previously required out-of-state residents to obtain a temporary license to carry a firearm through a process that gave wide discretion to the licensing authority. Under the now-invalidated law, the colonel of the State Police could deny applications “based on such terms and conditions as [they] may deem proper.” The SJC found this discretionary scheme unconstitutional under the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2022 decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, which requires gun regulations to be consistent with the nation’s historical traditions.

Who Is Affected?

If you’re an out-of-state resident who was charged under §10(a) or §10(h) after Bruen (June 23, 2022) but before the legislature changed the law (August 10, 2022), you are in the same position as Mr. Donnell and are entitled to dismissal of those charges.

Even if you were charged before Bruen, you might still be eligible for relief, as long as your conviction wasn’t final when Bruen came down. This primarily applies to defendants convicted after trial who had an appeal pending as of June 2022.

What About Massachusetts Residents?

The Donnell decision only addressed out-of-state residents, but its reasoning could soon extend to in-state residents who were subject to similar discretionary licensing schemes. The SJC is currently reviewing that issue in Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, with a decision expected later this year. Depending on that outcome, in-state defendants convicted under §10(a) between 2015 and 2022 may also have grounds for relief.

What Should You Do?

If you’re serving a sentence for unlawful firearm possession as an out-of-state resident, or were convicted but haven’t exhausted your appeals, now is the time to act. The Donnell decision could be the key to dismissing your case or overturning your conviction.

If you think your case might be affected, I’m happy to review your record and help determine whether a motion to vacate or dismiss is appropriate.

What Is an Application for Further Appellate Review (FAR) in Massachusetts?

After the Massachusetts Appeals Court decides a case, the losing party can ask the Supreme Judicial Court to review it through a process called Further Appellate Review, or FAR. This request gives the state’s highest court the opportunity to address important legal issues or clarify conflicting decisions.

An FAR application must be filed within twenty days after the Appeals Court’s decision. It explains why the case deserves review and what broader legal questions are involved. The SJC grants review only in a small percentage of cases, focusing on those that present significant or unsettled questions of law. The application itself is a written document, and the other side may file an opposition.

If the SJC grants the application, the case is fully briefed again and may be scheduled for oral argument. The court can affirm, reverse, or modify the Appeals Court’s ruling. Its decision becomes binding precedent for all lower courts in Massachusetts. If the SJC denies review, the Appeals Court decision becomes final.

Applying for Further Appellate Review is often the last step in the appellate process. Even when the SJC declines to take a case, filing the application preserves every possible avenue of review. For cases that raise important legal issues or constitutional questions, an FAR can be the key to achieving a fair outcome.

The FAR process is highly selective, but it serves an important role in ensuring that Massachusetts law remains clear, consistent, and just.

How Does the Criminal Appeals Process Work in Massachusetts?

The criminal appeals process in Massachusetts allows defendants to challenge legal errors that may have occurred during trial or sentencing. An appeal is not a new trial. It is a review of what happened in the lower court to determine whether the law was applied correctly and fairly.

The process begins when you file a notice of appeal within thirty days of the judgment or sentence. After that, the trial transcripts and other parts of the record are prepared and sent to the Appeals Court. Once the record is complete, both sides file written briefs explaining their arguments. The defendant’s brief points out the specific errors that may have affected the verdict, and the prosecutor’s brief argues why the conviction should stand.

In some cases, the Appeals Court will schedule oral argument. This gives each side a chance to discuss the case before a panel of judges and answer questions about their legal positions. The judges then issue a written decision that either upholds the conviction, reverses it, or sends the case back for additional proceedings in the trial court.

If you lose in the Appeals Court, you can file an Application for Further Appellate Review asking the Supreme Judicial Court to take your case. The SJC selects only a small number of cases each year, focusing on those that raise new or important legal questions. Even if review is denied, the appellate process ensures that serious errors are corrected and that defendants receive a fair trial under the law.

Appeals are time-sensitive and highly technical, but they play a critical role in protecting constitutional rights. If you believe your case was decided unfairly, an experienced appellate attorney can review the record and help determine whether there are strong issues for appeal.

Breath Test Results Thrown Out in Massachusetts: What the Hallinan Decision Means for OUI Defendants

Last week, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued a major ruling in Commonwealth v. Hallinan, 491 Mass. 730 (2023), reaffirming what defense attorneys have known for years: the state’s breathalyzer program was a mess, and the evidence it produced can’t be trusted. The decision formally excludes breath test results from a critical time period, June 2011 through April 18, 2019, unless the Commonwealth can prove their reliability in each individual case.

As a criminal defense attorney, I’ve seen firsthand how breath test results are often treated as ironclad evidence in OUI prosecutions. The Hallinan decision is a long-overdue recognition that science without transparency isn’t justice, it’s just conviction by shortcut.

What Did the SJC Decide?

The Court upheld a lower court finding that the Office of Alcohol Testing (OAT) failed in its obligations to ensure the scientific integrity of breathalyzer machines. Specifically, OAT withheld evidence, failed to disclose critical information about calibration practices, and essentially misled courts and defense counsel for years. The SJC ruled that breath test results from the Alcotest 9510 device during the affected time period are presumptively inadmissible unless the state can meet a high burden to prove reliability.

Who Is Affected?

If you’re facing an OUI charge based on a breath test between June 2011 and April 18, 2019, your defense just gained significant leverage. Prosecutors may now be forced to drop breathalyzer evidence entirely or prove in court why your specific test should be admissible.

For people who already pled guilty or were convicted during that period, Hallinan could also open the door to post-conviction relief. If your case depended on a breath test, it’s worth revisiting whether that conviction was built on unreliable evidence.

Why It Matters

Hallinan isn’t just about faulty machines, it’s about accountability. When the government presents scientific evidence in court, it has a duty to ensure that evidence is accurate, fair, and disclosed fully to the defense. The misconduct by the Office of Alcohol Testing violated that duty, and the SJC’s decision reflects the seriousness of that breach.

This case should serve as a warning: justice can’t be automated. Breath tests may seem like simple numbers, but behind those numbers is a system that depends on honesty, oversight, and due process. When that system fails, people’s lives are unfairly upended. I’m glad the SJC stepped in and I’ll continue fighting to make sure my clients are judged by facts, not faulty machines.